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Implicit and Explicit Belief Tracking
Martin Lages1* and Anne Scheel2
1 School of Psychology, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK, 2 Department of Psychology, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität
Munich, Munich, Germany
We investigated the proposition of a two-systems Theory of Mind in adults’ belief
tracking. A sample of N = 45 participants predicted the choice of one of two opponent
players after observing several rounds in an animated card game. Three matches
of this card game were played and initial gaze direction on target and subsequent
choice predictions were recorded for each belief task and participant. We conducted
logistic regressions with mixed effects on the binary data and developed Bayesian
logistic mixed models to infer implicit and explicit mentalizing in true belief and false
belief tasks. Although logistic regressions with mixed effects predicted the data well a
Bayesian logistic mixed model with latent task- and subject-specific parameters gave a
better account of the data. As expected explicit choice predictions suggested a clear
understanding of true and false beliefs (TB/FB). Surprisingly, however, model parameters
for initial gaze direction also indicated belief tracking. We discuss why task-specific
parameters for initial gaze directions are different from choice predictions yet reflect
second-order perspective taking.
Keywords: Theory of Mind (ToM), logistic regression, mixed models, eye gaze, decision making
INTRODUCTION
In order to understand the thoughts and beliefs of others we have to make inferences from their
behavior. Consider observing a person who walks down the street, suddenly stops, turns around
and walks into the opposite direction. We may infer that this person just remembered something
important leading to a change of plans. This kind of reasoning about another person’s mental state,
is called ‘mentalizing’ or ‘Theory of Mind’ (ToM; Premack and Woodruff, 1978). Having a ToM in
this context means appreciating that others follow their own goals and beliefs and may change their
mind or mental states. These states are not directly observable but may be inferred from behavioral
(Lee and Homer, 1999) and neural representations (Schaafsma et al., 2015).
In this paper we first describe the idea of implicit and explicit belief tracking before we derive
critical hypotheses. We then establish a novel method for investigating belief tracking in a game
between two players. We conducted a first experiment on belief tracking in adults and analyzed the
binary data using different types of logistic mixed models.
A general problem for testing hypotheses about belief tracking is that the probability for a belief
in a specific task and situation needs to be inferred from the performance of participants whose
understanding of the task and scenario may vary. Repetition of the same belief task should be
avoided because this may lead to beliefs being recalled by participants. Other typical issues in
studies on ToM and belief tracking are that missing data are relatively common and that the sample
size tends to be small.
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Non-parametric tests often lack power, have difficulties
to accommodate the full experimental design, and do not
acknowledge variability across participants. A better approach
is to model binary data in a logistic regression with mixed
effects. These models can determine task-specific fixed and
subject-specific random effects in most experimental designs.
Bayesian logistic mixed models, however, can predict individual
behavior by using weighted combinations of latent task-specific
and subject-specific parameters. Estimating latent parameters in
Bayesian logistic mixed models provides a more flexible approach
than logistic regressions because these models can estimate
missing values and accommodate individual distortions of belief
probabilities.
Mentalizing and Belief Tracking
Mentalizing is an important social cognitive ability that we
frequently use. It helps us to compete, co-operate, and
communicate with others. Mental states include different
motivational, emotional, and cognitive experiences such as goals,
desires, preferences, and beliefs. Beliefs are so-called epistemic
mental states because they are a representation of a state of reality
that can be true or false.
Tracking mental states such as goals and preferences appears
to be a relatively simple task that infants develop in their first
months (Gergely et al., 1995; Repacholi and Gopnik, 1997;
Woodward, 1998; Sommerville et al., 2005). Tracking true beliefs
(TBs) is relatively easy because the person’s representation of
reality is congruent with reality and with their own perspective.
Tracking false beliefs (FBs) can be more challenging because it
requires monitoring reality (as it is subjectively perceived) and
another person’s incorrect representation of reality. This is why
false-belief tasks have long been considered as the ‘litmus test’
for a fully developed ToM (Dennett, 1979; Wimmer and Perner,
1983; Lee and Homer, 1999). Over two decades, numerous
studies have established that 4- to 5-year-olds succeed in explicit
false-belief tests whereas 3-year-olds consistently fail (Wellmann
et al., 2001).
In sharp contrast to this, more recent studies using violation-
of-expectation (VoE) paradigms have suggested that 13- to
15-month-olds may already have an implicit understanding of
FB (Onishi and Baillargeon, 2005; Surian et al., 2007; Song
et al., 2008; Träuble et al., 2010). With more direct measures
of anticipation, the same pattern of results has been found in
children up to 2 years before they first pass explicit false-belief
tasks (Clements and Perner, 1994; Southgate et al., 2007).
Two-Systems Theory
This 2- to 3-year gap between the first emergence of implicit
tracking of beliefs and passing the explicit Sally–Anne test cannot
be explained by language development only (for an overview see
Lee and Homer, 1999).
It also speaks against traditional views of a continuous
transition from a premature ToM system covering simple mental
states to a mature system covering beliefs (Song et al., 2008;
Carey, 2009; Sodian, 2011). Apperly and Butterfill (2009) offered
a different and more integrative account. They suggested two
ToM systems that are not mutually exclusive, but form two stages:
an earlier-developing, fast and efficient but inflexible system that
rapidly tracks belief-like states and a later-developing slow and
complex but flexible system that can track various beliefs.
The fast and efficient system may be innate and shared with
intelligent and social animals (e.g., Hare et al., 2006; Clayton and
Emery, 2007). It allows tracking various mental states (including
beliefs) spontaneously and effortlessly, but its efficiency comes at
the cost of certain ‘signature limits’ (Apperly and Butterfill, 2009,
p. 960). The flexible system is thought to emerge later in ontogeny
and then to co-exist with the fast and efficient system. It covers
almost any kind of mentalizing in different situations, but its
flexibility requires additional cognitive resources. Typical human
adults should possess both systems but may only use the fast and
efficient system depending on factors such as task complexity,
time pressure, cognitive load, and motivation.
According to this theory, infants have a system in place that
can roughly compute others’ belief-like states in a number of
everyday situations, long before they are able to explicitly reason
about mental states. Adults on the other hand should be able
to access the flexible system depending on task requirements
in a given situation. This claim may be investigated by testing
whether implicit belief-tracking abilities in adults have the same
signature limits as infants. Here, we directly compare implicit
belief-tracking followed by explicit mentalizing in adults only.
Fast and Efficient Belief-Tracking
In order to define these signature limits, Apperly and Butterfill
(2009) suggested three possible mechanisms of a fast and efficient
system: ‘automatisation,’ behavioral associations, and so-called
‘registrations.’ Please note that the authors do not claim that
this list is exhaustive. Although automatisation and behavioral
associations cannot be ruled out, neither of these mechanisms is
sufficient to explain the current body of empirical findings.
Apperly and Butterfill (2009) advocate registrations as the
most plausible explanation for fast and efficient belief tracking.
Registrations are thought to be a proxy for beliefs: they link an
agent with an object and its properties (such as its location).
Registrations are stable over time: for instance when an agent
encountered an object in a certain location, this registration stays
valid until the agent encounters the object in a new location.
In the Sally–Anne test for example (Wimmer and Perner, 1983;
Baron-Cohen et al., 1985), the observing participant would be
able to track Sally’s FB by proxy of a registration: the link between
Sally, her toy, and its first location would stay valid after Sally
leaves the scene and until Sally realizes that her toy is no longer at
its location.
However, Apperly and Butterfill (2009) do not claim that
registrations provide an explanation for every kind of belief
reasoning. In order to be more efficient than sophisticated
mentalizing, they define the following limitations:
Registrations must be relations to objects and properties, not to
propositions; and registrations must have their effects on action
by setting parameters for action independently of each other and
independent of any psychological states... Accordingly, registrations
would support Level 1 perspective taking... but not Level 2
perspective taking. (p. 963)
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According to the above quote a fast and efficient system that
relies on registrations would have two main signature limits. It
would not cover Level 2 perspective taking, i.e., understanding
that an object can have a different identity or purpose for
someone else (e.g., Gopnik and Astington, 1988), and it would
not allow to track beliefs about mental states.
The first of these claims has been investigated and repeatedly
confirmed. Infants and great apes seem to be capable of
Level 1 perspective taking (Hare et al., 2000, 2001, 2006;
Luo and Baillargeon, 2007; Sodian et al., 2007) but fail at
Level 2 perspective taking (Call and Tomasello, 2005). In
implicit measures such as eye gaze, adults and older children
spontaneously track Level 1 but not Level 2 perspectives
(Ferguson and Breheny, 2012; Surtees et al., 2012; Low and Watts,
2013). The second claim – that a fast and efficient system cannot
track beliefs about mental states – has found less attention. This
is surprising because a number of everyday social interactions
require this type of mentalizing.
Imagine the following situation: a friend surprises you with a
box of chocolates. Unfortunately, the chocolates are peppermint-
flavored and you strongly dislike the taste of peppermint in
chocolates. If you are sure that your friend does not know about
your dislike, you may be grateful and feel touched, even though
you do not like the chocolates. Conversely, if you are certain that
your friend knows about your dislike, you may feel teased or even
get upset.
This is an example of a social judgment that is based on
implicit mentalizing: the donor of a gift is not only judged by their
behavior but also by their beliefs and intentions. According to
Apperly and Butterfill (2009), this kind of mentalizing would not
be covered by a fast and efficient system based on registrations.
As a consequence infants and great apes but also adults should be
incapable of implicit belief tracking.
This last prediction is contradicted by research suggesting
that even infants can make social judgments (Behne et al.,
2005; Hamlin et al., 2007, 2013). In a study with 10-month-
olds (Hamlin et al., 2013), the infants were asked to choose
between two elephant puppets after they had observed the first
elephant helping a lion puppet to achieve its goal and the second
elephant being not helpful (although both elephants performed
the same motor action). Critically, the elephant did or did not
know about the lion’s goal. Infants preferred the helpful elephant
to the unhelpful one only when the elephant knew about the lion’s
goal. To judge the elephants as helpful or unhelpful, infants had
to infer goals or intentions from the behavior of the elephants
while taking into account the elephants’ belief about the lion’s
goal. In other words, they had to track beliefs about mental
states – something a fast and efficient ToM system that relies on
registrations would not allow them to do.
Because these findings are at odds with one specific aspect of
an otherwise elegant theory, it seems worthwhile to investigate
this issue further. The main claim of the two-system theory
is the co-existence of two ToM systems, one of which is fast
and efficient whereas the second one is slow but flexible. The
fast and efficient system comes at the cost of certain signature
limits, and has been observed in infants and some primates by
recording initial eye gaze. The slow and explicit system on the
other hand requires cognitive effort and should be present in 5–
6 year-old children as well as adults when making explicit choice
predictions.
If the two-systems ToM is a valid model, adults’ implicit belief
tracking may parallel infants’ performance in the study by Hamlin
et al. (2013). If this is the case, the signature limits of the fast and
efficient system should be reconsidered.
On the other hand, if adults’ implicit belief tracking is similar
to their explicit performance or different from the results by
Hamlin et al. (2013) then the idea of a two-systems ToM may be
called into question altogether.
Belief Tracking in a Card Game
In the present study, we suggest a novel method to investigate
adults’ implicit and explicit belief tracking abilities. For this
purpose we devised a simple card game between two players (see
Box 1 and Figure 1). Three different matches were played to
model situations in which one of the players (Player 2) either
holds a TB or a FB about the goal of the other player (Player 1).
In a third game Player 2 may remain ignorant (IG) about the goal
of Player 1 but the IG match also included a control condition
(CL).
By asking participants to predict which of two cards a player
is going to choose, it is possible to test how accurately they track
different belief states. Unknown to the participants their initial
eye gaze was recorded by a built-in camera on top of the display
when a target and non-target card appeared on the left and right-
hand side of the screen.
BOX 1 | Rules of the card game as explained to participants.
Players, Cards, and Objective
• Two players;
• Standard 52 card pack (without Jokers);
• A game consists of two ‘sets’ with eight rounds each;
• In each set, one of the players is the ‘Agent’: Player 1 in Set 1, Player 2
in Set 2. The Agent first chooses one of the four suits as the ‘target suit.’
The choice is recorded but not revealed to the other player. It cannot be
changed during the set;
• The goal for both players is to collect as many cards of the target suit
(target cards) as possible.
Play and Scoring
• In each round, two cards are drawn from a shuffled deck and placed
face-up on a table.
• The players take turns in picking the first card: The Agent picks first in
Round 1, the other player picks first in Round 2, and so on. In each
round, the remaining card is automatically assigned to the other player.
This means, each player collects one card in each round, but can only
actively choose a card in every other round.
• The collected cards are recorded. The cards are put back into the deck
and shuffled, so that every card is equally likely to be drawn from the
deck in every round.
• At the end of a set the target suit is revealed. Each player receives one
point for each target card they collected.
• At the end of the game the total scores from both sets are compared.
The player with more points wins the game but a draw is also possible.
In Set 1 the Agent (Player 1) always knows the target suit whereas the other
player (Player 2) has to infer the target suit from the Agent’s active card choices.
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FIGURE 1 | Schematic overview of the two cards displayed in alternating rounds (R1–R8) in the True Belief (TB), False Belief (FB), and Ignorance
(IG/CL) match. Each choice is illustrated by a frame around the suit on the left- or right-hand side.
This implementation has several advantages compared to
classic perspective-taking tasks (e.g., Low and Watts, 2013).
A card game is an interactive and engaging situation most
adults are familiar with. Most card games require some form
of perspective taking and deceptive strategies are also relatively
common. This helps to avoid certain demand characteristics in
an experimental setup where adults may expect the agent to
be “omniscient.” Observing a card game between two players
clearly suggests that the beliefs of the two players involved
may differ from each other. Because the experimenter is in
full control of the displayed cards and the players’ choices,
the game is a versatile tool to measure flexibility in thinking
and to convey different belief states of players (Berg, 1948;
Grant and Berg, 1948). For the purpose of this study, we tried
to establish three scenarios suggesting a state of “TB,” “FB,”
and “ignorance” in the second player, but other scenarios are
possible.
Importantly, participants did not play the game themselves,
but watched two players who chose between two “randomly
drawn” cards in successive rounds. For each player the objective
of the game was to collect as many cards as possible from
the target suit (see Box 1 for detailed rules). At the beginning
of a match, Player 1 decided which suit was the target suit
and should be collected to gain points, whereas Player 2 was
not informed about this choice. Player 1 and the participant
therefore held superior knowledge about the goal of the
game. In order to gain as many points as possible, Player
2 had to infer the goal from the choices Player 1 made.
Depending on the cards and the choices of Player 1 the belief
state of Player 2 may change over time from ignorance to
TB or FB.
A FB can occur if Player 1 is deceptive and deliberately
leaves a target card to Player 2 at the beginning of a match.
This strategy can be more advantageous for Player 1 than
immediately collecting a target card in the first round because
it increases uncertainty about the target suit in Player 2. As
a consequence Player 1 may passively collect target cards in
subsequent rounds as long as Player 2 remains ignorant about the
target suit.
However, FB in Player 2 may also occur in the IG match. If
Player 1 is not deceptive but collects the same non-target suit then
Player 2 may develop a FB about the target suit (see Discussion).
The IG match also included a control condition (CL) in Round
3. In the CL task the participant had to predict the choice of
Player 1 who had selected the target suit in Round 1. Since
the participant was informed about the target suit the choice
prediction in CL should reflect simple first-order perspective
taking.
Design
Participants watched three different matches of this card game.
The matches were played so that in the last round of Set 1
(R8), Player 2 (BLUE) should hold a TB about Player 1’s (RED)
target suit (Spades), Player 2 (YELLOW) should hold a FB about
Player 1’s (GREEN) target suit (Hearts), and Player 2 (ORANGE)
should be ignorant (IG) about Player 1’s (PURPLE) target suit
(Clubs). Before they observed Player 2’s move in Round 8,
participants were asked to predict which card Player 2 would
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 4 November 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 1681
fpsyg-07-01681 November 2, 2016 Time: 11:38 # 5
Lages and Scheel Belief Tracking
choose. They also indicated on a five-point Likert scale how
certain they were about their answer (0 = not at all certain,
4 = very certain). Before this question was displayed on screen
and while participants were expecting to see one of the cards
move toward Player 2 as in previous rounds, their eye gaze was
secretly recorded by a built-in video camera in the computer
monitor. Their initial eye gaze was later coded as on/off target
in a binary scheme.
As a control (CL) the same procedure was applied to
Round 3 of the IG match in order to monitor first-order
perspective taking. First-order perspective taking occurred when
Player 1 (PURPLE) chose between a target card and a non-
target card. To keep the procedure comparable across matches,
participants were asked to predict the move of Player 1
(RED, GREEN) in Round 3 of the TB and FB matches as
well. In these rounds however, none of the cards were target
cards and participants’ predictions were recorded but not
analyzed.
The order of the three matches was varied across participants
to account for possible sequence effects. Each participant was
randomly assigned to a different sequence of tasks. Note
that the CL task always occurred in Round 3 of the IG
match.
Experimental Hypotheses
Our first hypothesis concerned the question whether a single or
two-systems ToM is used for initial eye gaze and subsequent
choice predictions. If gaze directions and choice predictions
correspond closely then a single ToM system may explain the
data. If the two measures are sufficiently different then they may
be governed by two distinct systems.
More specifically, if adults’ implicit belief tracking abilities are
determined by a fast and efficient ToM system and if this system
does not allow tracking of beliefs about mental states (Apperly
and Butterfill, 2009), then initial eye gaze on target should be the
same for TB, FB, and IG task but different from the CL task. On
target predictions in the CL task reflect the system’s ability for
first-order perspective taking (‘Registrations hypothesis’).
If the fast and efficient system can track beliefs about mental
states, in line with the findings by Hamlin et al. (2013), then
gaze responses should be above chance level in the TB (and CL
task) and below chance level (off target) in the FB and IG task
(‘Alternative hypothesis’). Finally, if there is no specific system for
implicit mentalizing, gaze responses should either be at chance or
above chance in all tasks reflecting an egocentric bias.
Adults’ explicit belief reasoning should be reasonably accurate.
In order to make explicit choice predictions, participants were
provided with all relevant information, had no time pressure, and
received a monetary reward of £0.50 for every correct answer.
Depending on the participants’ degree of certainty in each match,
choice predictions on target should be clearly above chance (on
target) in the TB and CL task, and clearly below chance (off
target) in the FB and IG task. The prediction that the IG task
also leads to below chance probabilities is a consequence of the
similarities between the FB and IG match: as in the FB match
Player 1 collected a non-target suit twice in earlier rounds (spades
in Figure 1). It is therefore reasonable to assume that Player 2
did not remain ignorant but developed a FB about the target
suit.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
A sample of N = 45 adult participants took part. Participants
were recruited from an online subject pool of the School of
Psychology, University of Glasgow. Two subjects were replaced
because they accidentally skipped at least one of the test rounds
in the presentation. The final sample consisted of 33 females and
12 males with a mean age of 22.6 years (SD= 3.74, age range: 18–
38 years). Participants were mainly undergraduate students (39
undergraduates, 3 postgraduates, 3 doctoral students) and came
from 19 different countries. Subjects were invited to participate
in individual sessions and received £3–£6 for their participation
(depending on their performance, as detailed below).
Procedure
Subjects were told that the study was about perspective taking
and gave written consent to participate. To ensure that the eye
gaze reflected implicit processes and was not biased by demand
characteristics, subjects were not informed that their eye gaze
would be recorded during the session. After the experiment, they
were fully debriefed and made aware that they could withdraw
their consent. Ethical approval for this procedure was obtained
from the Glasgow University College of Science and Engineering
ethics committee in line with the BPS Code of Ethics and
Conduct for Human Research and Ethical Principles for Medical
Research Involving Human Subjects of the WMA (Declaration of
Helsinki). Participants received £3.00 for their participation and
£0.50 for each correct prediction (out of six), so they could earn a
total of up to £6.00.
The participant proceeded through each match by pressing the
space bar on a keyboard. In the first part, the rules of the game and
the participants’ task were explained in a demonstration match.
In the second part, each participant watched three matches.
Although a match consisted of two sets (so that each player has
the advantage of being the agent in one set), participants only
observed the first set of each match to keep the experiment short.
They were told that they will have to predict the players’ choices
in two rounds of each match and that they should try to anticipate
the acting player’s choice of cards in each round. In fact, they were
only asked to make a prediction in Round 3 and Round 8 (test
rounds) of each match.
Two differently colored bars were displayed at the top and
bottom of the screen symbolizing the two players. In each round,
one of the colored bars was highlighted to indicate the acting
player (agent). Then two cards were displayed side-by-side on
the screen. In order to observe the active player’s choice, the
participant pressed the space bar and one of the cards would
move toward the player (up or down on the screen) to reveal the
agent’s choice. Next, participants viewed a score panel displaying
all previous rounds, the players’ choices up to the current round,
and how many cards of each suit they had collected in total
(actively or passively, see Figure 1). Note that only actively
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collected cards reveal an intention but that passively collected
cards affect the total score.
In the test rounds, a blank screen appeared after participants
pressed the space bar. After 2 s, they were asked to predict which
of the two cards the active player was most likely to choose.
Participants gave their choice prediction on a sheet of paper that
showed the card table, the latest score, and a question about the
certainty of their prediction. After filling out the response sheet
they pressed the spacebar to continue the presentation. They
watched the actual choice of Player 2 as immediate feedback on
the correctness of their choice prediction.
To minimize influence from visual saliency cues on eye gaze,
all cards in a match had the same number (TB match: 2s, FB
match: 10s, IG match: 8s) and the two cards in Round 8 had the
same color (Red or Black). The sequence of tasks and location of
cards with correct predictions was counterbalanced.
After the presentations each participant’s personal data were
collected, and they were debriefed and paid. All participants fully
engaged in the card game and stated that the game and tasks were
enjoyable and interesting.
Materials
The experiment was run on a MacBook Pro and presented on a
27′′ Apple Thunderbolt Display with a built-in high-resolution
video camera. A chin rest at a viewing distance of 65 cm was used
to ensure consistent quality of the video sequences. Participants’
faces and eye gaze were recorded using the built-in video camera
of the display. The small green LED next to the camera was
masked by black tape to conceal that the camera was in operation.
ScreenFlow 4 was used to simultaneously record participants’ eye
gaze and the presentation on screen.
Video Analysis
Each round started with a fixation cross at the center immediately
followed by two cards on the left and right hand side. After
1750 ms, a panel appeared between the cards with the words
‘Ready? Press space bar to watch the move.’ The panel and the
two cards remained visible and participants could view them
as long as they wanted. Upon pressing the space bar, the cards
disappeared and the fixation cross reappeared for 750 ms. The
cards were then displayed again for 1000 ms. In a regular round,
one of the cards then moved toward the active player to indicate
the Agent’s choice. In a test round, the screen went blank for
2000 ms (see Figure 2). Then another panel appeared, asking
participants to predict the choice of the Agent. Videos of the
participant’s face were taken from the onset of the second time
the cards were displayed to the end of the following blank screen
(see Figure 2).
The video clips were analyzed by one of the authors (A.S.) and
a researcher who was naïve about the hypotheses. File names were
randomized so that both coders did not know to which task a
given video belonged. Eye gaze was coded as the first saccade to
the left or to the right and later re-coded to 1= on target, 0= off
target. Inter-coder agreement was 96.8%. Disagreement in nine
rounds was resolved by discussion. In 11 rounds, participants
FIGURE 2 | Timeline of a test round indicating recording of initial eye gaze direction in a video sequence lasting 3 s.
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looked straight ahead during the video sequence and these
recordings were treated as missing values (NA).
RESULTS
We first report results from conventional statistics and two
logistic regressions models with mixed effects, followed by results
from Bayesian logistic mixed models.
Eye Gaze and Choice Predictions
As expected, participants’ explicit prediction that the active
player would choose the target card were above chance in
the TB and CL task, and below chance in the FB and IG
task (right panel in Figure 3). We performed non-parametric
Pearson Chi-Square tests on the relative frequencies. The explicit
choice predictions were all statistically significantly different from
chance (p < 0.001).
For the relative frequencies of gaze direction on target,
however, only CL was significantly different from chance
[χ2(1) = 9.09, p < 0.003] whereas performance was around
chance level (0.5) for TB, FB, and IG task (see Table 1 and
left panel in Figure 3). Thus the relative frequencies for gaze
direction did not clearly discriminate between TB and FB and
between Registration and Alternative hypothesis. This pattern of
results speaks against an overall egocentric bias or overall chance
performance, but it is unclear from the implicit measure whether
perspective taking took place.
The 2 by 2 contingency tables for each task and measure
were also computed. The results of McNemar tests on the
contingency tables indicate statistically significant differences
between implicit gaze directions and explicit choice predictions
for the FB [χ2(1) = 5.88, p = 0.015] and Ignorance task
[χ2(1) = 13.13, p = 0.0003] but not for TB [χ2(1) = 2.12,
p = 0.146] and the Control task [χ2(1) = 0.1, p = 0.752]. These
results suggest differences between tasks across measures but do
not take into account the full experimental design of the study.
Logistic Regression with Mixed Effects
To cover the full design of the study we conducted logistic
regressions with mixed effects on implicit eye gaze and
explicit choice prediction (R package lme4; Bates et al., 2014).
A “maximal” model (lmer max) with fixed effects for task,
measure and their interaction also had random slopes and
TABLE 1 | Summary of logistic mixed models.
Model type Dˆ pD DIC
Bayesian logistic
Model 1 382.1 7.9 397.9
Model 2 362.1 16.9 395.9
Model 3 314.8 23.2 361.2
Model 4 280.4 55.6 391.6
Logistic regression
lmer max 364.4 23 410.4
lmer pars 381.7 18 399.7
intercepts for task and measure (Barr et al., 2013). This model
gave a good fit in terms of the Akaike Information Criterion
(AIC = 410.4, equivalent to the Deviance Information Criterion
(DIC) for non-Bayesian models). A regression with the same
fixed effects but random slopes for measure only (lmer pars) gave
a more parsimonious fit in terms of AIC = DIC = 399.7 (Bates
et al., 2015). Similar to the maximal model this regression analysis
revealed statistically highly significant contrasts between CL task
as the baseline and FB (p = 1.37e-09) and IG task (p = 1.96e-
08) but no significant effect between CL and TB task (p= 0.679).
In addition, there was a statistically significant effect of measure
between eye gaze and choice prediction (p = 0.021). The
contrasts between tasks were qualified by statistically significant
interactions between eye gaze and choice prediction (measure)
for FB vs CL (p = 0.039) and IG vs CL (p = 0.004) in line with
the McNemar tests. Note that predictor variables (task, measure)
were centered on the mean and dummy coded before they were
entered into the regression analyses.
The logistic regression model captured fixed effects of task
and measure as well as their interaction while assuming random
slopes for measure. This mixed model produced the lowest AIC
among regression models and the significant contrasts suggest
differences in second-order perspective taking. Moreover, the
significant main effect of measure and the significant interactions
between tasks and measure indicate systematic differences
between implicit and explicit belief tracking. The results are
summarized in Appendix A.1.
Can we further reduce the predictive error (DIC) in a
related Bayesian approach? For example, we specified a logistic
regression model with random slopes and intercepts for each
subject but it was not possible to establish a model with
random slopes only. Bayesian logistic mixed models are more
flexible and can estimate latent task- and subject-specific
parameters under different constraints. Since these parameters
are not directly observable they may not match the task-
specific relative frequencies as shown in Figure 3. In addition,
Bayesian models can estimate missing data rather than throwing
away observations and Bayesian model selection offers a
straightforward procedure to compare different model variants
and to test the registrations and alternative hypothesis.
Bayesian Logistic Mixed Models
Inspired by Rasch models and Item-Response Theory (IRT)
we investigated Bayesian logistic mixed models with latent
task-specific and subject-specific parameters. IRT assumes that
latent variables such as item or task difficulty and subject
ability determine observed performance. Here, we adopt this
idea by applying a Bayesian logistic mixed model with
weighted combinations of latent task-specific and subject-specific
parameters to model initial eye gaze and choice predictions in our
card game.
As for the logistic regressions we employ the logit function
(inverse of the sigmoidal logistic function) on probability p.
logit(p) = ln
(
p
1− p
)
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FIGURE 3 | Observed relative frequencies on target for each measure (Left: gaze direction; Right: choice prediction) and task (TB, true belief; FB,
false belief; IG, ignorance; CL, control).
The model mixes latent variables θi and αj to predict relative
frequencies pij of binary gaze direction and choice prediction (on
target/off target). The mixing weight βi determines in log odds
how much an observer relies on task-specific probabilities on
target as opposed to a default probability on target.
The latent parameter θi reflects subject-specific inflection
points for participant (i= 1–45) whereas αj refers to task-specific
parameters for gaze direction (j = 1–4) and choice prediction
(j = 5–8) on target. In contrast to the logistic regressions we
did not introduce ‘measure’ as a factor but simply establish
probability estimates for all tasks and measures. Both parameters
αj and θi are expressed in log odds and are combined linearly
using a mixing weight βi . The mixing weight βi is equivalent
to the slope of a linear function in log-log space and models the
relative contribution of subject-specific θi and task-specific αj.
This particular mixed model is based on the (ubiquitous) log-
odds model (Zhang and Maloney, 2012) that itself is related to
a large family of probability weighting functions (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1974; Prelec, 1998; Gonzalez and Wu, 1999; Luce,
2000). Here, we use the log-odds model as a mixed model that
combines task-specific parameters with subject-specific inflection
points and mixing weights. For a recent application of the
log-odds model to decision-making see Boos et al. (2016).
We established four possible model variants. The Bayesian
Logistic Mixed Model 1 without subject-specific variability has
task-specific parameters αj, mixing weight β, and inflection
point θ.
logit(kij) ∼ β · αj + (1− β) · θ
In Model 2, we introduced subject-specific inflection points θi.
logit(kij) ∼ β · αj + (1− β) · θi
In Model 3, we used subject-specific mixing weights βi
that combine a single inflection point θ with task-specific
parameter αj
logit(kij) ∼ βi · αj + (1− βi) · θ
Model 4 is illustrated in Figure 4 and postulates a mixed model
with subject-specific weights βi and inflection points θi
logit(kij) ∼ βi · αj + (1− βi) · θi
All variants of the Bayesian logistic model assumed a non-
informative prior for task-specific parameters αj, a uniform
prior for (subject-specific) mixing parameters β(i), and a weakly
informative prior for (subject-specific) inflection point θ(i). The
latter parameter was centered on 0 in log odds (equivalent to
probability 0.5) because in each test round the participant was
asked to choose between two suits (on target or off target).
In a first step we established which model had the least
predictive error in terms of DIC. The DIC is a hierarchical
modeling generalization of the AIC and Bayesian Information
Criterion (BIC). As most information criteria the DIC lacks
a clear theoretical foundation (Plummer, 2008) but has
proven useful in Bayesian model selection problems where
the posterior distributions of the models are obtained by
MCMC simulation (Lunn et al., 2000; Spiegelhalter et al.,
2014).
Similar to AIC and BIC, DIC is an asymptotic
approximation as the sample size becomes large. However,
DIC is only valid when the posterior distribution is
approximately multivariate normal (Gelman et al., 2013).
DIC values should not be interpreted in absolute terms
but a lower DIC value in a model comparison indicates a
more parsimonious model fit. Depending on the specific
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FIGURE 4 | Graphical illustration of the Bayesian Logistic Mixed Model with subject-specific mixing and inflection points (Model 4). Parameters of
interest are task-specific αj , but also subject-specific βi and θi . Discrete binary observed parameters are shown in gray squares whereas continuous estimated
parameters are shown in white circles and the double circle denotes probabilities that can be determined. Plate notation with indices i and j groups the subject- and
task-specific parameters, respectively.
application a difference in DIC of more than 5 is considered
meaningful.
Not surprisingly the model with the lowest deviance (D̂)
was the logistic mixed Model 4 with subject-specific mixing
weights and subject-specific inflection points and the model
with the highest deviance was Model 1 with a single mixing
weight and inflection point. Model 1 allows no subject-specific
variability whereas Model 4 appears to overfit the data. The most
promising models are Models 2 and 3 but the most parsimonious
model with the lowest DIC value was Model 3 (DICModel 4–
DICModel 3 = 391.6–361.2 = 30.4). This model combines task-
specific parameters with a constant inflection point using subject-
specific mixing parameters. The model selection results are
summarized in Table 1.
MCMC Simulations
Parameters θi were drawn from a weakly informative prior, a
normal distribution on log odds centered on 0 and precision 1.
The normal distribution is a plausible prior for the latent variables
but it is not a conjugate for the likelihoods in a logistic model.
This makes it difficult to derive posterior distributions without
MCMC sampling.
The task-specific log odds αj were drawn from a non-
informative prior, a normal distribution of log odds centered
on 0 and a precision of 0.0001, whereas the mixing parameters
βi ∈ [0, 1] were sampled form a uniform distribution between
0 and 1. This constrains transformations of αj to inverse-S or
concave shapes.
In a hierarchical model extension we also introduced a hyper-
parameter for the standard deviation σ (gamma-distributed
parameter τ for precision) of parameter θi ∼ N (0, τ) of the
task-specific prior distribution (Lee and Wagenmakers, 2013).
The hyper-parameter reduced the credible intervals of parameter
estimates but increased the predictive error of all models and was
therefore not considered further.
Using the binary gaze directions and choice predictions from
N = 45 participants in four tasks, we ran MCMC simulations
for each Bayesian logistic model using the Metropolis–Hastings
algorithm as implemented in WinBUGS 1.4 (Lunn et al.,
2000; Lee and Wagenmakers, 2013) with an interface to
R (R2WinBUGS) to obtain posteriors and credible intervals
for the parameters of interest as well as missing values.
We defined three chains with 10,000 iterations each. The
length of burn-in was set to 1,000 and thinning to 1. We
specified different initial values for each chain (see Appendix
A.2 for BUGS model and Appendix A.3 for illustration of
output).
Comparing within and between variability of the chains
and traces in the MCMC simulations indicated convergence
on a single posterior distribution (̂R = 1.0) for all model
parameters and models including Model 4. We also checked auto-
correlations and found no notable correlation across lags. With
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convergence assured, we established posterior distributions and
credible intervals for the parameters of interest.
Two Systems ToM
The Bayesian Logistic Mixed Model 3 with subject-specific
mixing weights and single inflection point gave the best model
fit in terms of DIC. Model 3 also outperformed all tested logistic
regression models with mixed effects. We therefore used this
Bayesian model to test the hypothesis whether implicit eye-
gaze and explicit choice-prediction are better represented by
a single or two ToM systems. More specifically, we compared
a two-system ToM model with eight independent task-specific
parameters (four for eye gaze and four for choice prediction)
against a single-system ToM model with only four task-specific
parameters – one parameter per task for eye gaze direction
and choice prediction. The DIC clearly indicates that a two-
systems ToM with independent sets of latent parameters captured
the data better than a single-system ToM (DIC1Sys = 410.2–
DIC2Sys = 361.3= 48.9).
Registrations and Alternative Hypothesis
We also tested the Registration vs. Alternative hypothesis using
eye gaze as a proxy for implicit belief tracking by the fast and
efficient system. For the Registrations model we equated the task
parameters for TB, FB, and Ignorance (TB = FB = IG) for
eye gaze but assumed a separate parameter for CL because this
task relates to first-order rather than second-order perspective
taking. For the Alternative Model we equated the task parameters
for FB and Ignorance (FB = IG) for eye gaze. A comparison
between Alternative and Registration model with differently
constrained task-specific parameters and subject-specific mixing
weights favored the Alternative over the Registrations hypothesis
(DICReg–DICAlt = 369.8–362.6= 7.2).
In the following we contrast the results of Model 2 with
the results of Model 3 because they give different accounts of
probability weighting in log-odds and suggest different subject-
specific characteristics.
Bayesian Logistic Mixed Model 2
The box plot in Figure 5 shows the transformed log odd estimates
Prob(task j) = exp(αj)
exp(αj)+ 1
of the task parameters for gaze direction and choice prediction.
Estimates are expressed as probability on target for TB, FB,
Ignorance (IG), and Control (CL) of Model 2. Observed relative
frequencies on target for each measure and task are superimposed
as red dots.
For eye gaze the TB, FB, and IG estimates are close to chance
level (0.5) but follow a similar pattern as the estimates for choice
predictions. Note that the means of the task-specific parameters
correspond closely to the observed relative frequencies (red dots).
Model 2 has task-specific parameters that do not deviate
from the observed relative frequencies for each task. This is a
consequence of the individual weighting functions (red curves)
that are only slightly distorted from the diagonal suggesting
good discrimination between task-specific probabilities in all
participants (see Figure 6). In summary, the task-specific
parameters indicate clear first-order and second-order
perspective taking for choice predictions. Initial gaze direction
however, reflects first-order perspective taking (CL) but not
necessarily second-order perspective taking (TB, FB, and IG).
FIGURE 5 | Boxplot of estimated task parameters for eye gaze and choice prediction with median (horizontal bar), 50% (box) and 95% (whisker)
credible intervals. Task parameters (TB, FB, IG, CL) of Model 2 with subject-specific inflection point θi and mixing weight β are expressed as probabilities on target.
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FIGURE 6 | Task-specific parameters and subject-specific inflection
points θi in Model 2 lead to slightly distorted individual probability
functions (red curves).
Bayesian Logistic Mixed Model 3
Figure 7 shows task-specific parameter estimates of Model 3
for gaze direction and choice prediction transformed from log
odds to probabilities on target. The credible intervals for the
explicit choice predictions are clearly different for TB compared
to FB and IG task. The negative log odds for FB and IG give
probabilities on target that are almost at 0 whereas the positive
log odds for TB result in a probability of 0.97 (right panel of
Figure 7). A similar but less pronounced pattern emerges for gaze
direction (left panel of Figure 7). The probability estimate on
target for TB equals 0.61 whereas FB and IG have probabilities
of 0.10 and 0.20, respectively. The CL task has a probability on
target of 0.75 for eye gaze and 0.74 for choice prediction.
Interestingly, the CL estimates are almost identical for gaze
direction and choice prediction and also correspond to the
estimated inflection point θ= 0.75. Comparing eye gaze direction
with choice prediction, the TB, FB, and IG estimates for choice
prediction are less extreme and have larger credible intervals but
follow a similar general pattern as the task-specific estimates for
choice prediction.
The weighting functions in Figure 8 are similar to subjective
probability curves reported by Kahneman and Tversky (1979),
generalized by Prelec (1998) and Luce (2000), and also
investigated by Zhang and Maloney (2012). Note that inverse
S-shaped functions are typical for subjective probability in
decision making under risk and uncertainty. The inflection point
at 0.75 suggests an overall tendency toward the target for both
implicit and explicit measures. Task-specific probabilities below
θ = 0.75 were overestimated whereas probabilities above 0.75
were underestimated but with a different probability curve for
each subject.
The gradual increase in steepness of the inverted S-shaped
probability functions (Figure 8) suggests different degrees of
discrimination between task-specific beliefs across participants.
Some participants have probability functions that are almost flat
or horizontal indicating very poor discrimination between task
probabilities. Most participants, however, show a steeper increase
FIGURE 7 | Boxplot of estimated task parameters for eye gaze and choice prediction with median (horizontal bar), 50% (box) and 95% (whisker)
credible intervals. Task-specific parameters of Model 3 expressed as probabilities on target for gaze direction and choice prediction. Model 3 has a fixed inflection
point θ and subjective-specific mixing βi .
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FIGURE 8 | Subject-specific mixing of task-specific parameters and
inflection point in Model 3 leads to inverse S-shaped functions (red)
that are typical for subjective probabilities in decision-making under
risk and uncertainty.
in their functions and therefore better understanding of task-
specific differences. All participants shared the characteristic of
overestimating frequencies below the inflection point at 0.75
and underestimating frequencies above the inflection point.
Interestingly, the inflection point matches the task-specific CL
parameter α4 = 0.75 for eye gaze as well as α8 = 0.74 for
choice prediction. Both task parameters describe the tendency
for looking at or choosing the target according to first-order
perspective taking. The CL estimates and θ suggest that the
default for looking at and choosing a target card was higher than
chance level and similar for implicit and explicit measures across
all observers.
DISCUSSION
The specific aim of the present study was to test how well adults
can track belief states in others. Two main hypotheses were
put forward: (a) Adults use a fast and efficient ToM system for
implicit belief tracking that may be similar to infants and (b) this
system is different from explicit belief tracking.
Both hypotheses imply a fast and efficient ToM system
(Apperly and Butterfill, 2009) that can explain at least first-order
perspective taking and possibly some second-order perspective
taking (Hamlin et al., 2013).
If the fast and efficient system relies on so-called registrations,
initial eye gazes on and off target should be the same in tasks that
require tracking of beliefs about mental states, no matter if these
beliefs are true or false (Registrations hypothesis). If, however,
the fast and efficient system relies on different mechanisms that
allow tracking of mental states then participants’ gaze directions
may even discriminate between TB and FB tasks (Alternative
hypothesis).
Logistic regression models with mixed effects performed well
but a Bayesian logistic mixed model with subject-specific mixing
of latent task-specific parameters with a constant inflection point
provided a better account of the data. Bayesian Logistic Mixed
Model 3 suggests two systems and favored the Alternative over
the Registrations model hypothesis.
According to Model 3 the latent task parameters for eye
gaze were neither at chance nor did they match explicit choice
predictions. Importantly, they also did not reflect a simple
egocentric bias (TB = FB = IG = CL). Implicit eye gaze as
well as explicit choice predictions were anchored at 0.75 in the
CL task indicating first-order perspective taking whereas task-
specific probabilities on target as low as 0.1 and 0.2 in the FB and
IG task respectively suggest second-order perspective taking.
Probabilities on target for choice predictions but also for eye
gaze discriminated between TB and FB tasks suggesting second-
order perspective taking in both measures. Not surprisingly,
explicit choice prediction showed a clear appreciation of different
belief states in others whereas initial gaze direction reflected
reduced second-order perspective taking.
Although, the Ignorance (IG) match was constructed in such
a way that Player 2 would remain ignorant about the target
suit, participants’ choice predictions in the IG task were not at
chance level. Similar to the FB task participants predicted that
Player 2 would choose the non-target rather than the target suit.
Player 1 did not try to deceive Player 2 as in the FB match but
chose the same non-target suit twice. Therefore participants may
have assumed that Player 2 engaged in a “probability matching”
strategy. Probability matching is a simple heuristic whereby
Player 2 simply picks the suit that has been selected most by the
opponent (Player 1). Participants may follow this strategy when
predicting that Player 2 selects the non-target suit in the IG task.
If Player 1 had chosen each suit only once in the four rounds of
the IG match then Player 2 would have been truly ignorant about
the target suit. Such a match would have been a better scenario to
suggest ignorance in Player 2.
Future studies may investigate how adults track TB/FB over
successive rounds. If observers accumulate evidence in favor of
TB or FB across rounds then this may be reflected in their
initial eye gaze as a measure of implicit belief tracking. It
would be interesting to record initial eye gaze over successive
rounds to monitor whether observers’ updated prior odds are
reflected in their initial eye gaze. This updating process may
serve as an explanation for the similarities between implicit and
explicit belief tracking in the present card game. Updated prior
information may not only affect explicit choice predictions but
also initial eye gaze. Increased variability or noise in eye gaze
may have obscured the fact that adult participants rely on explicit
belief tracking when implicitly tracking the beliefs of others.
Despite these limitations, the present experimental paradigm
and theoretical approach appears promising to investigate
implicit and explicit tracking of beliefs in others. Our results on
a fast and efficient system are not conclusive but they seem to be
in line with the findings reported by Hamlin et al. (2013). In their
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study, preverbal infants judged agents by the agents’ knowledge
about the goal of another character. This supports the view that
adults’ implicit belief tracking could be guided by an implicit
system similar to infants’ social judgments. However, Hamlin
et al. (2013) did not include a false-belief condition in their study.
If infants’ and adults’ implicit performances correspond
then predicted signature limits of the fast and efficient
system as proposed by Apperly and Butterfill (2009) need
to be reconsidered. Converging results from infants’ and
adults’ implicit performance that also resemble adults’ explicit
performance supports the view that the fast and efficient implicit
system is more capable of belief tracking than previously
suggested. Alternatively, it is also possible that explicit belief
tracking influenced implicit belief tracking in the present card
game.
A critical question is whether there is a scenario that can lead
to opposite implicit and explicit belief tracking. The present card
game provides a versatile tool to create various perspective-taking
and belief-tracking situations. Different scenarios in this card
game may be developed into a diagnostic tool for evaluating ToM
abilities in typical and atypical populations. Possible applications
include research on individual differences in autism spectrum
disorder (ASD). Impaired ToM abilities are an important issue in
ASD, but there is still controversy about how far these problems
are mediated by motivational, attentional, and other factors (e.g.,
Peterson et al., 2013). One advantage of the present card game
is that it does not involve social cues that may give typical
participants an advantage over participants with ASD.
CONCLUSION
The card game in combination with Bayesian logistic mixed
models is a powerful tool to investigate implicit and explicit
belief tracking abilities in adults. Bayesian logistic mixed models
offer subject- and task-specific parameter estimates with credible
intervals even when the sample is small and data are missing.
These models are more flexible than logistic regression analyses
and can reveal characteristics in the data that would be missed
otherwise. However, Bayesian models need to be established
carefully and need to undergo thorough checks to make sure
that MCMC sampling results are not an artifact of the model
constraints.
At first glance the results from adult participants seem to add
evidence to a growing body of research that supports implicit
belief tracking as part of a two-system ToM. On closer inspection
however, after employing a Bayesian logistic model, initial gaze
direction as a measure of implicit belief tracking appears to reflect
explicit choice prediction. Further research needs to examine
whether adult participants are genuinely able to implicitly track
TB/FB or whether implicit belief tracking reflects second-order
perspective taking as a consequence of a belief updating process
across rounds. Inferring what others are thinking and intending
to do remains one of the most fascinating but also puzzling
abilities of a socially intelligent mind. At least in scientific
terms we are beginning to develop interactive paradigms and
quantitative tools that help to unravel the complex processing
associated with belief tracking as part of ToM.
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